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DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-ANCESTRAL PROPERTY-EXCLUSION OF NEXT 
OF KIN OTHER THAN HALF BLOODS-The decedent died intestate owning 
land which he had inherited from his father. His only next of kin were 
£our blood aunts and uncles on his mother's side, and three blood aunts 
and uncles on his father's side. The paternal aunts and uncles contended 
that the land descended to them alone by virtue of a section of the Ala-
bama code, which provides: "There is no distinction made between the · 
whole and the half blood in the same degree, unless the inheritance came 
to the intestate by descent, devise_ or gift, from or of some one of his 
ancestors; in which case all those who are not of the blood of such ancestor 
are excluded from the inheritance as against those of the same degree."1 
The lower court held that all the next of kin took equally. On appeal, 
held, affirmed. The "unless" clause of the statute can only be a qualifica-
tion on the rights of half blood collateral kindred. The aunts and uncles 
are all of the whole blood of the decedent and share equally. Caffee v. 
Thompson, (Ala. 1955) 81 S. (2d) 358. 
The statute considered in the principal case exemplifies the treatment 
given by the codes of thirteen states to ancestral property and inheritance 
by half bloods.2 The provision is a highly equivocal amalgamation of two 
ancient common law rules, one relating to the descent of ancestral prop-
erty and the other to the exclusion of half blood collaterals.3 The ambig-
uous phraseology of this and similar provisions of other codes has led to 
varying interpretations where whole blood collaterals are concerned. The 
principal case follows the majority position that the ancestral estate pro-
vision, as framed, is not intended to be an application of that ancient doc-
trine to the entire scheme of descent, but only to half bloods not of the 
blood of the ancestor.4 However, the Michigan court in In re Wortmann's 
-1 Ala. Code (1940) tit. 16, §5. 
2 Ala. Code (1940) tit. 16, §5; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1953) §254; Idaho Code 
(1948) §14-106; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §702.84; Minn. Stat. (1953) §525.17; Mont. Rev. 
Code Ann. (1947) tit. 91, §91-411; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) c. 30, §30-111; Nev. Comp. Laws 
(Hillyer, 1931; Supp. 1941) §9882-300; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) tit. 56, §56-0112; Okla. Stat. 
(1951) tit. 84, §222; S.D. Code (1939) tit. 56, §56.0113; Utah Code Ann. (1953) tit. 74, 
§74-4-17; Wis. Stat. (1953) c. 237, §237.03. 
3 See 42 YALE L. J. 101 (1932); 141 A.L.R. 976 (1942). 
4 In In re Pearsons, 110 Cal. 524 at 527, 42 P. 960 (1895), the California court 
rejected the contention that the "unless" exception had any application beyond the rights 
of half blood collaterals, saying: "Kindred of the half blood being the subject of the 
main proposition of the section is necessarily the subject of the exception which follows 
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Estate5 held that the exception applied to paternal and maternal ascend-
ants. In that case, a paternal grandmother was held to inherit land which 
came to the decedent from his father, to the exclusion of a maternal grand-
mother. How far the Michigan court would go in applying the "unless" 
clause of the statute as a qualification on the general scheme of descent is 
conjectural. A more difficult question than that in the Wortmann case 
will be presented when the two claimants are both members of a preferred 
class of heirs, rather than members of the broad "next of kin" class, as in 
the Wortmann case.6 The holding of the principal case is commendable 
in so far as it minimizes the discrimination, carried over from the common 
law, against half bloods and those not of the blood of the ancestor, because 
it will not exclude a claimant from the inheritance unless he falls into 
both categories. However, a more complete answer to the problem would 
be to drop all distinction based on half blood and ancestral estate as New 
York and Ohio have done.7 
George F. Lynch 
the word 'unless.'" See also Estate of Ryan, 21 Cal. (2d) 498, 133 P. (2d) 626 (1943); 
Estate of Kirkendall, 43 Wis. 167 (1877). 
5 210 Mich. 541, 177 N.W. 967 (1920). 
6 Such a case would be presented if A's paternal grandfather devised land to A, and 
A later died leaving his parents as his only heirs. Under the Michigan statute, the father 
and mother would share the land equally, but if the ancestral estate limitation is applied 
the mother would be excluded. See Ryan v. Andrews, 21 Mich. 229 (1870); Rowley v. 
Stray, 32 Mich. 70 (1875); Lyon v. Crego, 187 Mich. 625, 154 N.W. 65 (1915). 
7 13 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §83-11; Ohio Rev. Code (Page, 1954) 
§2105.06. 
